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IN THE SUPREME COURT
O·F· THE STATE OF UTAH
RUTH BUNKER HARDMAN, Ad- \
ministratrix of the Estate of
Oswald C. Hardman, deceased.
Plaintiff and Respondent,
-vs.-

\

GAINES EDWARD THURMAN and
WOODROW W. DICKEY, doing
business as Dickey Woody Produce
Company,
Defendants and .Appellants.

Brief of Plaintiff and
Respondent
STATEMENT OF FACTS
This action was brought by plaintiff as administratrix of the estate of Oswald C. Hardman in behalf of
the widow, a minor daughter and three minor sons of
the deceased. It arose out of an automobile accident at
the intersection of Twenty-first South and State Streets,
in Salt Lake City, Utah, on the 29th day of October,
1
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1949. The Hardman automobile was driven by the widow
of the deceased. Mr. and Mrs. Hardman had been working on some apartments being constructed in their home.
She suggested that they take a short ride in an attempt
to get the baby to sleep. (R. 208) The deceased was
riding in the front seat on the right-hand side of the
automobile. They had stopped at the Royal Dairy on
South State Street, and at Mrs. Hardman's suggestion
left there to go to Al Harris' Milk Depot, just ·east of
State Street on Twenty-first South to get an ice cream
cone. ( R. 208-9)
As they approached the Twenty-first ·South intersection, Mrs. Hardman was driving in the first lane west
of the center line. She made a signal for a left-hand turn
at about the time she \vas opposite the hospital. The
light was green as she approached the intersection. (R.
210) It was on Saturday night at approximately 9:15
and traffic was heavy. (ibid) One or two cars in front
of the Hardman car in the same lane made left-hand
turns, but the Hardman car stopped to permit several
cars to proceed north on State Street. It was stopped
south of the pedestrian lane in this position when a
tanker approached from the south and stopped in the
first lane east of the center line, waiting to make a
left-hand turn to go west. (R. 129 and 135) A tan automobile stopped in .the second lane east of the center lane,
apparently to permit the Hardma_n car to make its turn.
··When these two automobiles stopped and the way
appeared clear, Mrs. Hardman proceeded easterly on to
Twenty-first· South in low gear. She: had crossed ap·2
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proximately two and one-half lanes 'vhen the Hardman
automobile 'vas struck by the truck driven by defendant
Thurman and o"·ned by defendant Dickey. There 'vas
evidence that the truck was moving in excess of 42 miles
per hour at the time its skid marks first appeared on the
pavement. (See R. 96; and see the skid marks drawn on
Exhibit A.) The truck driYer testified that he "·as driving
in the eastermost lane, but there was some evidence that
he had swung from the first or second lane into the third
lane to pass the tanker and tan automobile which had
stopped. The truck driver testified that he could not see
an object directly in front of the tanker. (R. 260) Mrs.
Hardman testified that she never did see the truck. (R.

213)
Since the detailed evidence concerning the speed
and distances traveled by the automobiles is discussed
in the argument, it is not duplicated here. It is stipulated that Mr. Hardman died from the injuries received
in the accident, and this action was brought as a result.
The jury returned a verdict of $21,464.88.

STATEMENT OF POINTS RELIED UPON
POINT I.
THE QUESTION OF SPEED AS AN ELE~IENT OF
NEGLIGENCE WAS PROPERLY LEFT TO
THE JURY.
(a) The speed of defendants' truck was not the
only element of negligence.
(b) Proper foundation was laid for the testimony
of Dr. Swigart.
3
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POINT II.
THE QUESTIONS OF DEFENDANTS' NEGLIGENCE, C01~TRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE AND
PROXIMATE CAUSE WERE PROPERLY SUBMITTED TO THE JURY.
POINT III.
THE

COURT COMMITTED NO PREJUDICIAL
ERROR IN ITS RULINGS.

(a) The testimony of Witness Brady was properly
admitted.
(b) The expert opinion of Dr. Swigart was prop- .
erly admitted.
(c) The testimony of Witness Peterson as to the
· qualifications of deceased was properly admitted.
(d) The Court did not err in denying defendants'
motion for a directed verdict and defendants' motion
for dismissal.

POINT IV.
DEFENDANT CANNOT COMPLAIN OF THE INSTRUCTIONS OF THE COURT SINCE THEY
WERE MORE GENEROUS TO THEM THAN THE
LAW REQUIRES.
(a) The Court instructed that the negligence of
the plaintiff is imputable to the deceased as a matter of
law.
4
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(b) Requested Instruction No. 12 \vas adequately
covered by Instruction No. 15.
(c) The question of contributory negligenec \\Tas
adequately covered.
ARGU~IENT

POINT I.

THE QUESTION OF SPEED AS AN ELEMENT OF
NEGLIGENCE WAS PROPERLY LEFT TO
THE JURY.
·(a) The speed of defendants' truck was not the only
element of negligence.

In their brief (P. 5) defendants contend that the
only possible negligence on the part of Thurman was
the driving of the tru.ck at an excessive speed immediately prior to the impact. This is an incorrect statement
of the evidence and of plaintiff's theory and of the
theory of the trial judge. There was evidence to support
the following. claims of negligence: Failure to keep a
proper lookout for automobiles in and upon the highway,
and particularly the automobile driven by Mrs. Hardman; failure to have the truck under control, and particularly failure to have the truck under control so that it
could be stopped, and particularly to avoid the striking
of the automobile driven by Mrs. Hardman; failure of
the driver of the truck to avoid striking the Hardman
automobile after its presence became known; proceeding
through the intersection on Twenty-first South and State
5
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Streets in the most easterly lane of traffic when such
lane of traffic terminates at Twenty-first South, i.e., the
attempt of the defendant Thurman to pass three abreast
through the intersection at Twenty-first South, particularly. in view of the fact that the truck driver knew there
were only two lanes north of the intersection and it
would be necessary for him to cut in in a westerly direction in passing through said intersection; passing
through the intersection when two other cars in the
lanes to the west of the defendant had stopped to yield
the right-of-way to the Hardman car; failure to yield
the right-of-way to the Hardman car.
The attention of the Court is invited to the fact that
the truck driver testified that he was traveling only 20
miles an hour as he entered the intersection. (R. 236)
This testimony is in the face of the physical evidence
to the effect that there were skid marks 127 feet long,
indicating that the truck had skidded 76 feet. (The
truck is 51 feet long.) Section 57-5-205, Paragraph (b),
of the Utah Code requires that a vehicle must be in
proper co~dition to be stopped in 30 feet at 20 miles per
hour, so that if the jury believed defendant Thurman's
testimony as to the speed, it certainly could have found
him to be negligent in not stopping in time to avoid the
accident. Especially is this true in view of the undenied
evidence that the brakes and other stopping mechanism
of the truck were in proper working condition.
The point made is that speed was not the only element of negligence here. The evidence concerning speed
6
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must, of course, be considered with the other citcumstances. These matters 'vere coYered adequately by Instruction No. ~ (R. 55); Instruction No. 4 (R. 58); Instruction No. 5 (R. 59), and Instruction No. 6 (R. 60).
(b) Proper foundation was laid for the testimony
of Dr. Swigart.

Perhaps the major contention of defendants' brief
is that there 'v-as insufficient data upon which to base
any expert opinion as to the speed of the truck. Defendants contend that there was no evidence of skidding by
the truck. Defendants do not contend that Dr. Swigart
is not a qualified ''""itness to compute the speed of the
truck if sufficient data was furnished; nor do they complain of the exactness of the computations if the data
was correct.
The jury was, of course, not obliged to agree with
the witnesses concerning the data or its exactness. The
questions to Dr. Swigart assumed the facts to be as indicated in the questions. The jury was advised fully that
it \vas to determine whether the data was correct.
It is submitted that there is ample evidence that the
truck skidded.
Officer Brady of the Salt Lake County Sheriff's office and Officer Clark of the Salt Lake City Police Department, Traffic Division, testified as to the measurements of the skid marks made by the truck. Officer
Brady testified as follows:
7
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

'' Q. Will you tell us whether there were any
skid marks at the impact, leading from either one
of the automobiles, either car or truck~
A. Yes, there were several skid marks, Officer Clark and I measured.

Q. Did you measure the skid marks from the
truck~

A. Yes, we did.
Q. Will you describe the skid marks from the
truck~

* * * •
A. The skid marks from the trailer were the
heaviest marks and up to the point of impact,
and from the impact on in we measured more
skid marks.
The first marks measured from evidently
where the air set them. We measured from there
to where the car came to rest. There were several skid marks there, cars going sidewards and
which I learned from the truck was the left
front-"

* * * *
''A. We measured the skid mark where the
air was applied and also the skid mark from the
point of impact to where the car rested-that is
the left front tire.
end~

Q. And did you hold the

A. I read it off. Officer· Clark held the stationery end and I held the end with the measurements.''

*

*

*

*

'' Q. Will you just describe the mark left by
the truck~

8
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A. Yes, it ""as the left front tire of the truck,,
the one that left the skid ma.rk; we measured from
the point of impact to where the car came to rest.

Q. South of the point of impact what did the
mark look like~
A. The south point of the impact was heavy,
the trailer marks left were the heaviest, marks
made by the trailer.
Q. Have you ever driven an object similar to

tha.t

truck~

A. Not quite that large. I have driven a semitrailer with tractor and trailer, not that large.

Q. Are you familiar with the braking manipulation for stopping a unit of that kind~
A. Yes.

Q. And can you tell us whether you looked at
the tires of this outfit to determine whether there
had been any skidding~
A. Yes, I did. I checked the duals on the
trailer on the left side, on the right side, the load
evidently was leaking, the refrigeration was leaking and I didn't check that.
Officer Clark - we had to go under the trailer
to get the marks. As he went under it, I went
around it. I would see where the tire had been
drug.

Q. (by Mr. Hanson) Which tire,

Officer~

A. That is the tractor tires on the left rear."
(R. 112-113.)
And on Page 115 :

"Q. (by Mr. Burton) Now, will you describe
the mark that appeared on the pavement south
·9
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of the point of impact,- do you· understand, Mr.
Brady'
A. Yes, those were heavy marks.

Q. Just describe them.
A. They were wide marks like I have said,
like the trailer had been locked and drug.''

'' Q. You inspected the rear trailer

wheels~

A. Yes.

Q. You saw where they

skidded~

A. That is correct.

Q. Did you check the tractor wheels of the
truck~

A. No.
Q. They may or may not have been skidding?
A. It was a routine check. I just happened to
find them by accident and make a mark they had
been slid ; I didn't make a specified check of all
tires to see whether all had been slid.''
Officer Brady was able to point out to the jury on
the photographs the location of the skid marks which he
measured (R. 115-116). Officer Brady further testified
that he could not describe the details of the density of
the mark but ''it was a slide mark, a tire mark made by
sliding." (R. 120)
On cross-examination he pointed out to the jury
"marks caused by sliding tires." (R. 122)
10
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Officer Clark further testified concerning the skid
marks. From their place of beginning, 57.1 feet south
of the curb line at Twenty-First South, they measured
81.7 feet to the point of impact. (R. 143-144) These
marks were drawn to scale by the officer on the map
identified as "Exhibit A". Officer Clark testified that
the marks which he and Officer Brady measured were
clear and discernible and that he could see them clearly
and distinctly. ( R. 152)
The attention of the Court is invited to the fact that
the Hardman car was pushed sidewise and northerly by
the impact a distance of 45.3 feet. The skid marks made
by the Hardman car were measured, and Officer Clark
testified that these marks were the same as to color and
density as the marks left by the truck. (R. 154-155) He
further testified that what he measured at the scene of
the accident was skid marks. (R. 163-164) This followed all of the cross-examination by defendants' counsel, wherein an attempt was made to get a distinction
drawn between various kinds of marks made by tires
on roads.
It is submitted that the record in this case shows
clearly and conclusively that the truck skidded into the
intersection the distances testified to by the witnesses.
Certainly there is competent evidence from which the
jury could have concluded that the tires skidded these
distances.
The testimony of Dr. Swigart certainly is conclusive if the data upon which it is computed is accurate.
11
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This is admitted by defendants' counsel, in his statements during the trial. (R. 179) The doctor was extremely careful not to speculate; he was generous to the point
of giving defendants every benefit of doubt. His calcu1ations· did not take into consideration the fact that the
greatest stopping force was applied to the truck before
it commenced its skid. ( R. 17 5-17 6) Neither did they
take into consideration the energy consumed by the collision between the car and the truck. A glance at the
photographs of the car introduced in evidence certainly
indicates that that energy would have been considerable
in itself. (R. 189)
Coupled with this evidence as to skidding is the
testimony of the truck driver Thurman that he locked
his wheels (R. 244); that the truck had just been rebuilt
from the ground up, and, as far as he knew, the brakes
were applied evenly on all wheels at the same time (R.
256) ; that at 20 miles per hour the truck could stop
within 30 feet (R. 257). The testimony of his driving
companion Huber was to the same effect. (R. 278-279)
Defendants contend that the truck did not skid but
that the tire mark was left by the contact of the tire of
the truck with the road surface in the tire whipping the
road. In other words, the stopping motion· of the tire
on the road could. cause a mark, but the tires were not
skidding. Defendants therefore contend that the formula applied by Dr. Swigart was prejudicial, since it
depends upon the idea that the tire was sliding. In this
connection the evidence is clear and the physical fact
12
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is 'vithout contradiction that the truck \vas going at n
much greater speed than \vas indicated by Dr. S\vigart 's
formula. The stopping- force of the Yehirle \vould he
greater if the tires \Yl'l'l' not sliding than if they were. The
formula of Dr. s,vigart, therefore, \vas generous to the
defendants if defendants' contention is correct. t~ertainly
they haYe no justifiable complaint to its application.
Dr. Swigart's discussion of this principal appears
throughout his testimony. It is especially clear at R. 17 4175. He concludes:
"If there is any mark that would be called a
skid mark left at all, then I would say you would
be very safe in using the co-efficient of sliding
friction because if there is any skid mark being
left at all, you would have a co-efficient as great
as co-efficient sliding of friction because the other
would be a tire mark, because that is rolling and
once it starts sliding a little bit, so long as the
tire isn't rotating free rolling speed, with that
speed you "rould be perfectly justified in using
co-efficient sliding of friction, it might be greater
than that because it isn't sliding, this would be' a
reasonable figure to use." (R. 175-6.)
What complaint can defendants have to the use of
expert testimony based upon data weighed in such a
conservative fashion as this. Certainly under the available data it is clear that defendants' truck was being
driven at a rate of at least 42.5 miles per hour. If it was
going faster than this speed, how can they complain~
The jury is entitled to have presented to it the most
accurate data available. Such data was submitted and
considered.

13
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Appellants argue that the Court erroneously admitted the testimony of Dr. Swigart, because he did not
personally conduct any test to ascertain the co-efficiency
of friction on the surface involved in this accident. It is
submitted that this contention is facetious on its face.
Dr. Swigart testified that he had a Ph.D. major in
physics; that he had conducted experiments on friction
and sliding objects for twenty years at the University of
Utah; that he had made studies relative to the co-efficiency of friction, and was familiar particularly with
the study of tires sliding upon road surfaces. He testified that if he was given the data he could determine the
speed of the vehicle by the skid marks left by the vehicle
upon the surface over which it skidded. He demonstrated
to the jury the formula used to compute the speed. (R.
166, 167, 168) He was certainly qualified to testify as
to what the speed would be, based upon the data furnished by the other witnesses.
One cannot read the testimony of Dr. Swigart in
the record without being impressed that his opinion was
based upon scientific accuracy and carefully studied
computations, and that he displayed the utmost caution.
Certainly defendants have no right to complain that this
evidence was submitted to the jury for consideration.

14
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POINT II.
THE QUESTIONS OF DEFENDANTS' NEGLIGENCE, CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE AND
PROXIMATE CAUSE -\'{ERE PROPERLY SUBMITTED TO THE JURY.
Appellants rely primarily on the cases of Cederloff
v. Whited, 110 Utah 45, 169 Pac. (2d) 777; French v.
Utah Oil Refining Co., ______ Utah ______ , 216 Pac. (2d) ·1002;

Fox v. Lavender, 89 Utah, 115, 56 Pac. (2d) 1049.
With reference to the negligence about which defendants complain of plaintiff in this action, these cases
are not in point. It is respectfully submitted that none
of these cases applies to the facts in the case at bar. In
the Cederloff case the driver making the left-hand turn
in front of the vehicle was proceeding south and a turn
was made directly in front of a north-bound vehicle. The
testimony was clear that there was nothing between the
two vehicles to obstruct the vision of either driver. Defendants' negligence in that action was the sole proximate cause of the accident as a matter of law, because
the Court concluded that the plaintiff had a right to assume that under the circumstances the plaintiff was continuing in a south-bound direction or would permit plaintiff to pass before proceeding across the highway. Defendant could see plaintiff's vehicle all the time, and
plaintiff could see defendant's vehicle. There was nothing to obstruct the view.
15
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Similarly, in French v. Utah Oil Refining Company,
supra, the Court held that our statute governing the
turning vehicle at an intersection required the person
making the turn to exercise reasonable care for his own
safety. The Court said that when there is a reasonable
possibility that the movement cannot be made in safety,
then the turning driver should yield. In that case as in
the Cederloff case, the turning drivers had unobstructed
view of traffic approaching from the opposite direction.
In both cases, if the turning drivers had looked they
would have seen the approaching vehicle and, in the
exercise of reasonable judgment, the Court held that
. they should either have stopped to permit the approaching vehicle to proceed or they were guilty of negligence.
Fox v. Lavender has no application as far as the negligence problem is concerned.
Our case does not come within the scope of these
decisions because the driver of the Hardman automobile
in the case at bar could not see from her position at the
intersection the approach of the Dickey truck. Between
her automobile and the Dickey truck on the inside lane
for north-bound traffic was a big oil tanker. On the
next lane to the east was a tan sedan. The headlights
of these vehicles glared into the face of Mrs. Hardman.
Directly east from these two lanes, just off the curb,
was the big Utah Oil service station with glaring, bright
lights. Traffic was heavy in the intersection. The tanker
and the tan car stopped, apparently yielding the rightof-way to Mrs. Hardman. She looked then to the East
to the pedestrian lane to determine whether anything

16
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obstructed the contemplated movement of her automobile. Nothing was there and she proceeded to move the
car in an easterly direction, "'\Yatching south and east at
all times.
Can this Court say as a matter of la"'\Y that under
these facts and circumstances ~Irs. Hardman is bound,
in the exercise of reasonable care, to anticipate that a
thirty-ton truck and load is going to be barrelling into
that intersection in the outside lane at a speed in excess
of forty miles per hour J ~Ir. Thurman, the driver of
the Dickey truck, testified that he could not see an object
in front of the tanker. Ho,y·, then, can the Court say
that 1\Irs. Hardman as a matter of law was bound to
anticipate that there was a reasonable probability that
a vehicle of the size and weight and speed of the Dickey
truck was going to enter the intersection in the easternmost lane? Certainly the Court cannot hold that it is
neg-ligence as a matter of law for a driver of a vehicle
making a left-hand turn in an intersection not to anticipate such reckless and wanton disregard for the safety
of others.
Some point was made of the fact that the trailer
on the Dickey truck was thirteen feet high. Of course,
this is an element to consider in passing upon all of the
circumstances. It is also true that the Hardman car
was so far to the south in the intersection that Mrs.
·Hardman was unable to see the semaphore. The light
had been green for some time and, like any other experienced driver, Mrs. Hardman anticipated the change
in the stopping of north-bound traffic. In fact, almost

17
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instantaneously with the collision the light did change
for northbound traffic from green to yellow, according
to the testimony of witness Lariente.
Mrs. Hardman accelerated her car from a stopped
position to seven miles per hour at a uniform rate. At
42 miles per hour, the truck would, therefore, have been
600 feet south of the intersection at the time she commenced her turn. (See testimony of Dr. Swigart, R. 192,
193.) In view of the fact that the truck was to her invisible, is this Court to hold as a matter of law that
she was negligent in not anticipating, in the language of
the French case, that "there is a reasonable probability
that the movement cannot be made in safety~" Certainly the facts of this case are different from those
which have heretofore been before the Court, and the
principles governing the standard of care to be exercised by the driver of the Hardman vehicle must not be
confused with the situation present in previous decisions
and previous cases.
Moreover, the Court's attention is invited to the
fact that Mrs. Hardman was not as a matter of law the
agent of her husband at the time she was driving this
vehicle. It is true that her husband was the owner of
the automobile, and, under these circumstances the case
of Fox v. Lavender, on which the defendants rely so
heavily, holds that she was presumably driving at his
direction. However, Mrs. Hardman's testimony in this
case rebuts that presumption. The suggestion to drive
from the Royal Dairy to the ice cream shop was hers.
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Her husband did not ever give her any directions as to
the course she should take or as to the precautions she
should take in making the journey. The presumption of
agency certainly should not have been converted into a
conclusion of fact for the jury.
In any event, in this regard the defendants cannot
complain because the Court instructed the jury that as
a matter of law l\lrs. Hardman was Mr. Hardman's
agent. The jury was further instructed that plaintiff in
the action was the deceased's agent. Of course, plaintiff
in the action is a quasi-trustee for the benefit of the
heirs and widow. Certainly the Court's instructions in
this regard were in no way prejudicial to the defendants ;
in fact, defendants received more generous instructions
than those to which they were enttiled under the law.
POINT III.
THE COURT COMMITTED NO PREJUDICIAL
ERROR IN ITS RULINGS.
(a) The testimony of Witness Brady was properly

admitted.
Defendants complain that Witness Brady was permitted to answer the following question: ''Assuming
that the evidence in this case will show that the foot
brake operates both the tractor and trailer wheels, then
an air brake in proper functioning order would apply
equally on all wheels, would it not~" The answer to
this question was in no way prejudicial to defendants.
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Both Th1irman and Fuger testified that Thurman locked
his wheels (R. 244) ; that the brakes were applied evenly
on all whe.els at the same time. (R. 256; 278-279)
An examination of the exhibits by the witnesses
disclosed that the skid marks made by the front wheels
of the truck extended to the place where the Hardman
car came to rest after being pushed northward across
the intersection. The same skid marks showed the rear
wheels of the truck. It is clear that all of the brakes,
both as to tractor and trailer, were set. The answer by
Witness Brady was therefore certainly in no way prejudicial to defendants. (See the photographs marked exhibits 2 and B and the map marked Exhibit A.)
(b) The expert opinion of Dr. Swigart was properly admitted.

This point has been discussed in detail under
Point I. Dr. Swigart made a computation based upon
measured skid marks and an actual test to determine
the co-efficient of the friction. It was a conservative
calculation because it did not take into consideration
any of the factors evidencing spe.ed except the skidding
of the truck. Certainly there was evidence for the jury
to consider as to whether the tires skidded.
(c) The testimony of Wi-tness Peterson as to the
qualifications of deceased was properly admitted.

Mr. L. C. Peterson testified that he was SecretaryTreasurer of Bailey, Inc., and that Mr. Hardman was
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manager and accountant of this corporation at the time
of his death. He testified that to his kno,vledge J\L r.
Hardman's abilities had been discussed at a meeting of
the board of directors, and he kne'Y there ·w·onld be an
opportunity for him to advance as the company continued to develop. There is nothing prejudicial in any
of the rulings as to admissibility of his testimony. Certainly the attitude and opinion of an employer is admissible in determining the future earning capacity in
an action of this character.
(d) Defendants' motion to dismiss was properly
denied.

It is apparent that there was competent and reasonable evidence from which the jury could determine that
the defendant Thurman was negligent in driving his
truck, and that the deceased was not guilty of contributory negligence. These factors were discussed under
Point II. The cases relied upon by defendants do not
apply to the circumstances of this case. The unanimous
verdict of the- jury amply demonstrates that there was
sufficient evidence to support plaintiff's judgment.
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POINT IV.
DEFENDANTS CANNOT COMPLAIN OF THE INSTRUCTIONS OF THE COURT, SINCE THEY
WERE MORE GENEROUS TO THEM THAN THE
LAW REQUIRES.
(a) The Court instructed the jury that the negligence of the plaJintiff was imputable to the deceased as
a matter of law.

The Court instructed the jury that if the plaintiff
was negligent in the operation of the Hardman vehicle,
and if she ''suddenly and carelessly and negligently
made a left turn in front of defendants' approaching
truck without first ascertaining that such movement
could be made with safety and under such circumstances
that Gaines Edward Thurman, the driver and operator
of defendants' truck, could not reasonably have expected
or anticipated that plaintiff was going to so turn to the
left, then the speed, if any, of defendants' truck would
not be a proximate cause of the collision, and if you further find that plaintiff carelessly and negligently made
said left hand turn as hereinabove stated, then your
verdict must be in favor of defendants and against the
plaintiff, No Cause of Action.'' (Instruction No. 11; R.
66) Instructions concerning contributory negligence are
also contained in Instruction No. 13 (R. 68) and Instruction No. 7 (R. 62). The Court thereby instructed the
jury that as a matter of law any negligence of Mrs.
Hardman was imputable to her deceased husband.
22
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Defendants rely upon the case of Fox ·o. La·ve~uder,
89 Utah, 115, 56 Pac. (2d) 1049. Defendants' Instruction No. 4 is to the same effeet as the instructions of the
Court given, viz: that the negligence of Mrs. Hardman,
if any, "\Yas imputed to her husband. The Fox v. Lavender case does not so hold and the law is to the contrary.
Fox r. Lavender only holds that if the automobile is
owned by the husband and he is a passenger at the time
of the accident, and the 'vife is driving the automobile,
then a presumption arises to the effect that the wife is
driving as an agen~ of the husband. The presumption
merely permits the jury to find that the wife was driving
as her husband's _agent and under his control. It does
not require the jury to so find. It simply permits such
an inference.
Moreover, in the case at bar the presumption was
clearly rebutted by evidence which established that at
no time did Mr. Hardman give any instructions as to
the driving of the car, either with reference to the
course which should be followed or as to its operation
while en route. The instructions given by the Court
were therefore more generous than they were· entitled
to receive. They presented defendants' theory unmistakably to the jury. The giving of Instructions Nos. 4
and 5 simply would have been unduly repetitious and
would add nothing in substance to those already given.
(b) The matters covered by Instruction No·. 12 were

adequately presented by Instruction No. 15.
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In defendants' Instruction No. 15 the Court stated
that any damages should be computed by way of allowance for pecuniary recompense, and that they should
include the amount of support to the wjfe and minor
children, the money value of the loss suffered by the
wife and minor children by reason of loss of comfort
and society, and that general damages could not ~exceed
$75,000.00. There was no issue in the case as to any
element by reason of the pain and suffering of deceased;
there was no such argument to the jury at any time.
Considered as a whole, the instructions adequately
covered the proper elements of damage. No prejudicial
error was committed by the Court's failure to give defendants' Instruction No. 12 in defendants' language.
(c) The question of contributory negligence was
adequately covered.

Most of defendants' requested instructions reiterated the idea of contributory negligence. In their brief
defendants complained that each and every one of the
r~quested instructions were not given. As has been
pointed out to the Court, the Trial Judge gave at least
three instructions concerning what conduct on the part
of plaintiff would amount to contributory negligence in
this case, and that such conduct would bar plaintiff's
recovery. Defendants' requested instructions were un.duly repetitious and argumentative. As has been shown,
the instructions were more generous than defendants
had a right to have given. As has been shown, the instructions gave to .defendants every benefit of doubt.
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The jury found that there "·as no contributory negligence. It is submitted that the instructions adequately
presented defendants' theory of the case, and failure to
giYe Instructions Nos. 7 and 11 "·as in no '"ay prejudicial.
It is respectfully submitted that the jury was entitled to consider the questions of negligenee, contributory negligence, proximate cause and damage in the case
at bar. The application of the doctrine of the Cederloff
and French cases certainly should not be extended to the
circumstances now before the Court.
Respectfully submitted,

McKAY, BURTON, McMILLAN
AND RICHARDS,
Attorneys for Plaintiff
and Respondent
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